The Fisheries Proposals: An Assessment

CHANNING KURY0

INTRODUCTION

Several major proposals for the regulation or division of the international fisheries were made at the Law of the Sea Conference
at Caracas, Venezuela in 1974. A few broad generalizations can be
made concerning these proposals as an introduction to this assessment.
Douglas Johnston has observed that"... the juridical problem
of the world's fisheries is to establish and maintain a public order
of the seas that will allow equitable and efficient sharing so as to
maximize the benefits obtainable from the resources without
threatening their future productivity."' This problem is a classic
case of a variable-sum or mixed-motive contest in that the interests
of the various nations are simultaneously both partially opposite
and partially congruent. The interests are opposite in that a fish
taken by one nation cannot be harvested by a fisherman of another
nation. The interests are congruent in that a well regulated fishery
can be an ongoing, bountiful supply of food and other benefits for
many nations.
* Court Attorney, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Alaska.
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The principal function of the Law of the Sea Conference, as
Deutsch noted in a much more general context, is the provision
'of a basis for coordinating nations' expectations and actions. 2 An
understanding of what was and is going on in the area of the law
of the sea was neatly summarized by Claude's discussion of "the
urge for formally declared and generally acknowledged legitimacy"
as a feature of politics. He observed that:
This urge requires that power be converted into authority, competence be supported by jurisdiction, and possession be validated
as ownership. Conversely, if we look at it from the viewpoint of
those who attack the status quo, it demands that the de facto be
denied or deprived of de jure status, that the might of their antagonists not be sanctified as right. The principle is the same,
whether we are dealing with those who want the is to be recognized as the ought, or those who are setting out to convert their
ought into a newly established is. Politics is not merely a struggle for power, but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in
which the conferment or denial, 3the confirmation or revocation,
of legitimacy is an important stake.

Although the 1974 conference at Caracas was in large part presaged by Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian,4 there were those, much

like Morel in The Roots of Heaven,5 who were inevitably disappointed as to what was actually done. 6 Some of this disappointment has fueled an effort at unilateral action, notably, a 200-mile
interim fishery zone for the United States. This effort has been
controversial since there has been no clearly defined and widely
recognized "national interest" on this matter. While United States
coastal fishermen would apparently gain by such a zone, United
States distant water fishermen fear other nations acting similarly.
Other issues include whether such an action would provide a basis
for ,other nations to curtail movements of the United States Navy
and whether such interim action would be proper in light of the
ongoing Law of the Sea Conference.
These introductory comments are made in order that the following assessment may be read with a realistic frame of mind. Law
is typically evolved through controversy with many inherent limitations and costs. There will not be, in fact cannot be, an optimal
2. K. DEUTSC THE ANALYSIS OF INTRNATIONAL RnIATIoNs 161 (1968).
3. I. CLAUDE, THE CHANGING UNrmr NATiONS 74-75 (1967).
4. Brown & Fabian, Diplomats at Sea, 52 FoEIGN AWAmsHs 301 (1974).
5. R. GAY, THE ROOTS OF HAVEN (1958).
6. See, e.g., Coffey, 55 NATIONAL FsImHiAN No. 7 (Nov. 1974).

body of law for the utilization of the sea. What can be hoped for,
though, is a corpus juris that will be responsive to natural and societal limitations and demands. It is chiefly with this criterion in
mind that the following assessment has been made of some of the
fisheries proposals.
ANADROMOUS FISHERIES

Anadromous and catadromous fisheries differ from many marine
resources in that these fisheries have an obvious dependency upon
habitat located within recognized and well-defined national borders.
In migrating through fresh-water, these fish are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and environmental degradation within these
areas of indisputable national interest. Some of these fish, such
as salmon and eels, spend significant periods of their life-cycles
in zones of the ocean in which they are vulnerable to exploitation
by any nation. A question arises as to how the regulation of the
use of such a resource should be premised.
At least two polar premises exist. One is that -theState through
which anadromous and catadromous fish pass should have the predominant, if not exclusive, right to regulate the exploitation of the
fisheries associated with it7 The other premise is that all interested States should have an equal right to participate in the regulation of these fisheries.8 This latter premise might be tenable
since the historically international marine zones are essential to the
life-cycles of many of the natural anadromous and catadromous
fisheries. However, the first premise is superior to the second for
reasons that have to do with maintaining public order and good
stewardship of fiashery resources.
One reason is that the "State of origin" or the "producing State",)
7. E.g., 1974 'United Nations Law of the Sea Conference [hereinafter
Conference], Second Committee Informal Working Paper No. 4 (9 Aug.
1974) [hereinafter Sec. Com. WP4], Provision XIX (Formula C) and
Provision X
(Formula A); Conference, Second Committee Informal
Working Paper No. 5 (Aug. 13, 1974) [hereinafter Sec. Com. WP7].
Re catadromous fisheries: Conference, Sec. Con. WP4, Provisions XX
and XXIV.
8. E.g., Conference, Sec. Com. WP4, Provision XIX. (Formula B) and
Provision XXII (Formula B); Conference, Second Committee Informal
Provision IV (Formula A, Part 5); Conference, Sec. Com. WPT, Provision
XXII (Formula A) and Provision XXIII. These provisions do, however,
pay lip service to the special interest of the "producing State" (see note 9,
infra).
Conference, Sec. Corn. WP4, Provision XIX (Formula A) is a compromise
proposal.
9. The term "producing State" is used in this paper to mean a nation
which geographically contains the locus of a significant part of the life
cycle of a stock of anadromous or catadromous fish. The term here does

[VOL. 12: 644, 1975]

The Fisheries Proposals
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

bears costs in maintaining the runs of fish. These costs include
expenditures for research, fishways, pollution control, -hatcheries,
and domestic regulation. No other States bear any burden in regard to these fisheries except to the extent that they refrain from
the destruction of the marine habitat or refrain from maximum exploitation of the fish stocks during their marine phase. If these
other States are given a major voice in the regulation of these fisheries, there will be a tendency for the "producing State" to undervalue the resource (resulting in the under-maintenance of the
fishery during the critical fresh-water passage), unless the other
states contribute significantly to reducing the economic burden of
bearing the resource. A proposal addresses the problem in a special
context by providing that "[t]he coastal State shall receive reasonable fees for fish caught by foreign vessels in its economic zone,
with a view to making an effective contribution to coastal State
fisheries management and development programmes."' 10 However,
it appears that this proposal as drafted would not apply to the anadromous fisheries.
Secondly, the "producing State" is a "prominent solution,"'" since
the anadromous and catadromous fisheries are associated with objeotively determinable nations. The alternative of ' all interested
nations" can only be determined by very subjective standards.
This latter alternative contemplates a regulatory body that would
be primarily a function of short-term demand with vagaries of expressed "interest" over the long-run, rather than a baseline regulatory body that can insulate a resource against roving exploitation.
A third reason, which may be powerful among laymen and politicians but which is question-begging, is the feeling that "those fish
belong to us since they come from our country." This position has
an antecedent in the Nineteenth Century fur seal controversy in
which the United States attempted to assert jurisdiction over the
that the seals originated
harvesting of pelagic seals on the premise
12
from islands owned by the United States.
not imply exclusivity of production since more than one nation may be
"producing States" for a stock of fish since, eag., certain stocks of salmon
pass through the United States to reach redding areas in Canada. Furthermore, the portion of the life cycle spent in the ocean is also part of '"production."
10. Conference, Sec. Com. WP7, Provision XVIII (Formula B, Part D).
11. The term comes from Deutsch, supra note 2.

12. See JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 205-212, 264-269.

In sum, what is suggested here is not necessarily that the "producing States" should have exclusive rights to the bounty of anadromous and catadromous fisheries. Rather, it is suggested that
it would be appropriate that these countries be given a predominant

presumption of favor which cannot be infringed upon by the simple
demand for exploitation by other nations.
The Law of the Sea Conference has before it several proposals
for the control of anadromous fisheries which would adopt one of
the premises in some form.' 3 While the vesting of the predominant
interest or exclusive control in the "producing State" appears to
be superior, it is not at all certain that such proposals will be adopted. There are some precedents in international controversies for
deference to the "producing States", as evidenced in the recent
agreement between Denmark and Canada with regard to Atlantic
salmon. These precedents involve a few nations resolving real and
present conflicts, but the Law of the Sea Conference should be trying to foresee and resolve potential conflicts as well.
If the world community is about to grant significant interests in
ocean resources, the members of that community obviously would
want something of the grants. A direct division of the regulatory
authority and the catch is appealing, but such arrangements would
tend to be unwieldy. As long as only a few nations are involved,
the problem is not so significant. 14 If more than a few nations are
involved, the whole process can break down due to widely divergent
interests appearing to be irreconcilable. 15 The resulting tendency
is to do as one wishes, which brings disaster to fisheries.' 0 The
alternative is commendable. The anadromous and catadromous
fisheries should be entrusted to the "producing States" at least to
the extent that they have the decisive voice in developing the regulation of the anadromous and catadromous fish stocks.
TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH

.While it is evident that the coastal States will be given the predominant, if not exclusive, legal interest in the coastal fisheries,
proposals have been made that other nations be allowed to harvest
the difference between the harvest by the coastal State and the
13. See notes 7 and 8, supra.
14. Clarkson, InternationalLaw, U.S. Seabeds Policy and Ocean Resource
Development, 17 J. L.w & EcoN. 117, 123 (1974) agrees.
15. See, e.g., Christy, Northwest Atlantic FisheriesArrangements: A Test
of the Species Approach, 1 OcEuA

Day. & IN'L L.J. 65 (1973).

16. Per a "tragedy of the commons."

See G. HARmn, EXPLORING NEw

ETHICS FOR SuRvivAL: THE VoxcE OF THE SPACESHInP BEAGL

(1968, 1972).
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"allowable catch." 17 While such a provision may be noble, it would
be litigious. The problem is critical in those fisheries which have
been over-exploited in the past and which could eventually become
much more productive in the future. How much fish should be
harvested as product and how much should be saved as capital is
a highly complex problem involving questions of data collection,
bio-mathematics, economics, and numerous assumptions of a social
and political nature. Because of this complexity and because it is
desirable to allow depleted fisheries to restore themselves, foreign
fishermen should not be given a right to exploit the balance of an
"allowable catch". The coastal State should be allowed to determine the amount of fish to be harvested by its fishermen, what
portion (if any) to be harvested as a privilege by foreign fishermen,
and what amount should be reserved as biological capital. The rationale of this suggestion is that the determination of the harvest
should not be subject to determination by more than one authority
since the alternative would apparently be a clash of resource practices. Of course, some supra-national authority may be needed to
provide a basis for acting in the case of over-exploitation under
the aegis of the national authority endangering the resource.18
The reason for granting the coastal States the predomniant, if not
exclusive, legal interest in the coastal fisheries is primarily political, 19 although under some circumstances the externality consideration is valid to a limited extent.20 However, there is at least one
objectively good reason why the coastal States should have the predominant influence in the control of the coastal fisheries: coastal
States are objectively determinable and their fishery zones can be
mechanistically determined with a given zone width and baseline
rules. Proposals to give land-locked nations a share of nearby coast17. E.g., Conference, See. Com. WP4, Provisions XVI and XVII. Noteworthy is the proposal that a nation might prohibit any exploitation of marine mammals under its jurisdiction regardless of any theoretical "allowable
catch". See Conference, Sec. Com. WP4, Provision XXV.
18. See Kury, The Application of a Market Theory to the Regulation of
InternationalFisheries,1 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 355 (1974).

19. Politics is, of course, the name of the game. See also, e.g., Wooster,
Scientific Aspects of Maritime Sbovereignty Claims, 1 OcEAN DEV. & IrfL
L.J. 13 (1973).
20. The economic and ecological aspects of environmental degradation re
coastal fisheries are extremely complex and comprehensive studies are
needed.

al fisheries 21 produce complications but the result would still be
relatively simple compared to the "all interested nation" approach.
FIHING AS A FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS
A provision in one of the working papers of the conference has
22
three formulations of a principle of freedom of the high seas.
Fishing is included within the purview of the principle, which recognizes the de facto situation for high seas fisheries. The provision
in any of its formulations is so open-ended and nebulous that its
real significance cannot easily be pinned down. However, if the
principle is to be elevated to a formal tenet by the conference, fishing should be specifically excluded as a freedom of the high seas.
The practical problem is that, for one reason or another, fishermen of a nation may wish to raid a high seas fishery. The freedom
of the high seas principle, as now formulated, would give such an
action protective coloration in law, which could effectively undermine, at least for an interim period, an otherwise good management
program for the fishery. A partial remedy might be the elevation
of a minor proposal to a general principle for the law of the sea.
That now minor proposal is the provision that "No State can be
exempted from the obligation to adopt conservation measures on
the ground that sufficient scientific findings are lacking. ' 23 In the
past, nations have used the argument of insufficient information
as a means to avoid confronting critical conservation issues. The
history of the International Whaling Commission is an important
example.
The argument of insufficient information can be valid since it
is conceivable that a nation or a group of nations would act to exclude fishermen of other nations from a fishing ground by basing
the exclusion on a bogus management plan. This type of abuse
can be remedied better by diplomacy than by simply sending in
more fishing vessels to create a confrontation. In any case, despite
the existence of highly sophisticated fishery models, practical considerations often prevent any precise understanding of a particular
fishery. The argument can be pursued to 'the point that any managment scheme would be open to question, a dangerous situation
if fishing is to be considered a freedom of the high seas. Manage21. E.g., Conference, Sec. Com. WP4, Provision X; Conference, Second
Committee Informal Working Paper No. 9 (17 Aug. 1974), Provision XVII.
22. Conference, Sec. Com. WP7, Provision XV. But see JOHNSTON, supra
note 1, at 303-317.
23. Conference, Sec. Co. WP4, Provision XXII (Formula A, Part 1[4]).
See also Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, [1958] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969.
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ment plans or regulatory schemes which are in good faith and are
based on realistic amounts of information need the protection of
presumptions that fishing is not a freedom of the high seas and
that conservation schemes are to be followed. The alternative is
simply for the tendency to favor confrontation in the fishing areas.
THE NEED FOR A STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLE

Mentioned throughout the various working papers are mildly
worded statements that the productivity of the fisheries is to be
maintained. 24 Unfortunately, no provision clearly appears for correcting a situation in which a nation over-exploits a particular fishery. Mistaken application of economic theory combined with a
fatalistic belief in the ineffectiveness of international law might be
conducive to the harvesting to the point of exhaustion, or even ex25
tinction in the case of some of the great whales. Interest rates
and capital theory simply do not justify the total harvesting of
these biological forms nor does the "tragedy of the commons"26 dictate irremediable irrational results since the "commons" qua "commons" can be eliminated.
The decline of the great whales illustrates the problem. Industry
negotiations failed in conserving the great whales, particularly the
blue whale. The reasons for this failure lay in the political-legal
matrix surrounding the economic framework of whaling. Illusions
dominated facts and exploitation eventually precluded timely,
thoughtful resolution. George Small drafted a conservation brief
on the demise of the blue whale,27 in which the whaling countries,
particularly Japan, were indicted for the gross mismanagement of
a magnificent resource, or, if you would, a favorite companion on
Spaceship Earth. 28 Small concluded that the reasons for the failure
24. E.g., Conference, See. Com. WP4, Provision XXI, and Sec. Com. WP7,

Provisions XVI, XVII, and XX.
25. See Clark, ProfitMaximization and the Extinction of Animal Species,
81 J. POL. EcoN. 950 (1973).
26. Hardin, supranote 16.
27. G. SmALL, THE BLUE WHALE (1971).
28. Mnm IN Ta WATERS: A BOOK TO CELEBRATE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF
McIntyre ed. 1974).
WHALES Am DoI~vNs (J.
George F. Kennan has taken a position that the interests of '"mankind
generally, together-and this is important-with man's animal and vegetable companions" must be the basis of environmental conservation. See
Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
401, 408 (1970).

of the International Whaling Commission to effectively conserve
the whales were three. First, the Commission chose to hold its
meetings in private with access denied to the press. Second, the
Commission was perpetually under-financed. Third, and most important, the Commission was denied the power to impose effective
restrictions on each of its members without each member's consent.
A few additional points are worth mentioning in regard to the
ineffectiveness of the International Whaling Commission. First, the
Japanese commissioner to the International Whaling Commission
from 1951 through 1965 (a critical period in the demise of the blue
whale) was not a government official as such but rather was the
chairman of the Japan Whaling Association, an organization of
whaling companies.2 9 The conflict of interest in such an appointment is obvious in light of Dr. Harry Lillie's comment that:
The President of the largest Japanese whaling company ... was
indeed difficult to deal with, insisting on breaking off all further
discussions if I could not agree with him that there were plenty
of whales left and that the killing could go on without restrictions. The President of the third company. .. , while not as extreme, was just as determined to go on with the killing until such
time as the industry collapsed from the wiping out of the whales.3 0

The pursuit of illusion by the Japanese went so far as the postulating of a new subspecies of blue whale which could be harvested
in an unregulated manner since it was not within the effective pur-

view of the existing agreements. Such a postulation was entirely
untenable.3 1
Although self-righteousness and greed are not to be underestimated in resource executives, it is not necessary to ascribe these
qualities to the whaling executives. They could have been simply
mistaken in their understanding of resource economics. After all,
a fisheries economist at a prominent American university opined
in a letter that "[t] he problem . . . is a standard problem in capital

theory and I do not agree that certain species should not be fished
out if it is economic to do so".32 The professor is, of course, begging
the question, a peculiarity not limited to laissez-faire market econ,omists since it appears that Marxian philosophy is similarly hamstrung in resource management.33

The great whales existed in an international arena unstructured
in international law, yet no one nation or group of nations ap-

parently felt it to be in its interest or had the capability to force
29. Small, supra note 27, at 159.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 161.
Id. at 200-02.
In my personal files.
See P. P=NE,CONSER VATioiT rm

Sovw

UNioN 42-44 (1972).
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a major confrontation with Japan or other whaling nations. Little
could be done without an evolutionary major confrontation since
at that time no rights were vested in non-exploiting countries.
Hence, any strong action (e.g., major trade restrictions) by the nonexploiting nations to effectuate 'conservation measures by the exploiting nations would have appeared to the world community to
be unreasonable. This conceptual block to action might have been
avoided by conferring property status on the great whales, 34 but
this solution would have been dependent upon a much higher degree of concern than apparently was present in the world community from 1945 to 1965. The fault, then, in the management of
the great whales was not necessarily the inexorable operation of
economic forces but rather the decision-makers' perceptions of the
problem and their lack of willingness to act effectively to conserve
the whales.
The problem has not been limited to whales, since "fish fisheries"
can be "exhausted," i.e., the stock becomes so depleted that the productivity is so far below the environmental potential that maximum
productivity cannot easily be regained. Because of this exhaustion
problem, as well as the extinction problem, the law of the sea
should include some sort of remedy to correct mismanagement of
resources. One possible remedy would be the specification of compulsory United Nations jurisdiction over marine fisheries and the
automatic loss of rights and privileges to -theharvest if the fishery
becomes endangered. In other words, the law of the sea should
reflect the fact that fishery resources can be abused and a means
should be provided so that control of the endangered resource can
be easily exercised by an authority with broader concerns than
short-run profits. As long as the law of the sea divides up the
resources so that some sort of right is recognized to vest in certain
nations, other nations which may be concerned about these originally international resources might not act to preserve the resource
if the law does not specify that they may act to protect their interests (even if these interests might only be potential). The alternative is that a certain right to the fisheries will stymie any exercise of uncertain rights of ultimate control.
This problem of stewardship raises a fundamental question about
the Law of the Sea Conference. Is the raison d'etre of the con34. See Kury, supra note 18.

ference the coordination of unilateral actions by the various countries or a convocation of the world body politic from which will
be derived the law of the sea? It is conceivable that in 'the negotiations leading to the division of the fisheries a right will be retained
to act against a nation which is destroying a renewable resource,
but such a provision is unlikely despite how much it is needed.
CLOSING CoMrr
It appears that the Law of the Sea Conference is moving towards
some comprehensive corpus juris for international fisheries, which
in itself would produce an increase in world order and in marine
conservation since many of the rules will be clarified and certain
practices and positions will become untenable. It is clear that the
nations of the world are not about to give the ocean resources to
the United Nations and that discussion at the conference centered
on the division of the bounty of the seas. Real choices exist, nevertheless, and it remains to be seen what the Law of the Sea Conference will finally favor.

